

The Philanthropist.

PUBLISHED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE OHIO STATE ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY.

GAMALIEL BAILEY, Jr., Editor.

We are verily guilty concerning our brother therefore is this distress come upon us.

SAMUEL A. ALLEY, Printer.

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THE PHILANTHROPIST,

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF OHIO.

REPORT

Of the Select Committee of the Senate, on the petitions of
sundry citizens, praying the repeal of certain laws re-
stricting the rights of persons of color; and for secur-
ing to all persons within the jurisdiction of the State,
the right of trial by jury. Presented by Mr.
King in Senate, March 3, 1838.

MR. KING, from the Select Committee on the
subject, made the following Report.

The Select Committee to which was referred
the numerous petitions of the citizens of this State,
asking the repeal of certain laws, imposing restric-
tions and disabilities upon persons of color, not
found in the constitution, and which the petitioners
aver to be contrary to its principles; and also pray-
ing that the right of trial by jury, may be secured
to all persons within its jurisdiction; respectfully
present the following report:

That they are fully sensible of the difficulties and
perplexities which have been thrown around this
subject, from motives of State policy, from popu-
lar prejudice, from self-interest, and from excited
apprehensions of impending danger; and also of the
extreme sensitiveness of public feeling, upon
the agitation and discussion of all questions, con-
nected with it, and the suspicion and obloquy
which attend every effort, and attach to every
person, that contributes in the smallest degree, to
present it to the consideration of the American
people.

Notwithstanding this threatening array of in-
vective feeling and excited prejudice, your com-
mittee have proceeded calmly and dispassionately,
but firmly and conscientiously, in discharging the
duties assigned them, under a deep sense of all
their responsibilities to their fellow beings, to their
country and its constitutional authority, to the im-
mutable principles of justice and equity, and to
that Supreme Being, from whom all power is de-
rived, and to whom all moral agents are amea-
nable.

And while they are constrained to believe, that
popular feeling has been perverted and led astray
upon these important subjects through mistaken
views of public policy, and moral duty; they have
no desire to animadvert upon the motives or causes
which have induced it, and they would gladly
avoid all those exciting questions, calculated to
inflame the public mind. Their only wish has been,
to present the several questions submitted to their
consideration, fairly before the Legislature, for
their deliberate examination, and if their judgment
and reason do not urge them to act in the prem-
ises, the committee will seek no additional impulse
from any appeal to their passions.

The Principles of '76.

There was a time in the history of our country,
when the privilege of "enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protect-
ing property, and of pursuing and obtaining hap-
piness and safety, was declared to be the natural,
inherent, and unalienable right of all men, and
recognized as one of the great and essential prin-
ciples of liberty and free government;" when the
dissemination of these principles was every where
acknowledged to be a public duty, and a moral
virtue; when they met a cordial response from the
breast of every American patriot; when their advo-
cates were hailed as the "great apostles of civil lib-
erty;" when their total disregard was made the sub-
ject of repeated complaint and remonstrance against
the parent government, from which we revolted;
when they were relied upon, as a justification for
abolishing a form of government in which they
were not recognized; and when they were solemnly
and officially promulgated to the world, as self-
evident truths, on which all rightful governments
should be based, and upon which our own was to
be "forever unalterably established" and adminis-
tered.

Nor were these sentiments, at that period, con-
fined to any particular section of the country, or
regarded as the mere abstract principles of a vi-
sionary theory, or speculative philosophy; but they
were inculcated as practical maxims, applicable to
the condition of man, suited to the state of human
society, "essential to liberty and free government,"
and in numerous instances, incorporated into our
political systems and forms of government. In ac-
cordance with these principles, the first act of
Congress, on assuming jurisdiction over the North
Western Territory, after its cession by the States
of Virginia and Connecticut, by the ordinance of
1787, declared, "There should be neither slavery,
nor involuntary servitude, in said Territory, other-
wise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof a
party shall have been duly convicted;" with a
further provision, that whenever any portion of
said Territory should be admitted as a State into
the confederacy, "its constitution and government
should be republican, and in conformity to the
principles contained in said ordinance."

Actuated by the same spirit of liberty and equal
justice, one State after another abolished the sys-
tem which had been established while under a co-
lonial government, of withholding from a portion
of their fellow beings those natural and personal
rights which, as a nation, we had declared to be
inalienable, as emanating from Deity, and as the
common inheritance of the whole human family.

So expanded was this feeling, so powerful was
its impulse, and so practical its effects, that within
the short period of a few years, eight out of the
thirteen States originally in the confederacy, and
which subsequently united in forming the present
federal constitution, had discarded this system from
their constitutions and laws, and restored their fel-
low creatures to liberty and freedom. In these
events we have a happy illustration of the facility
with which public opinion and long-established
customs and modes of thought may be made to
yield to the power of truth and moral obligation,
when left to their free and unrestrained influence.
It was owing to the spirit of the times, to the vir-
tue of the people, to the freedom and firmness with
which these principles were discussed and maintain-
ed, and to a readiness in the public mind to listen to
the voice of reason, and yield to the convictions of
duty, that such important results were effected. It
was to the untiring energies and eloquent appeals
of such men as Franklin and Jefferson, that Amer-
ica is indebted for the incorporation of these fun-

damental principles into our constitutional form of
government, and for the emancipation of a portion
of our territory from the evils of a system which
had once pervaded the land. That fervency of
zeal and philanthropy of feeling which appear to
characterize all the writings of the latter, in the
cause of civil liberty, seem to partake almost of the
spirit of prophecy, when portraying the direful
calamities and future consequences which would
result from the continuance of this system. In
reference to the evils of the system, he says:

"The whole commerce between the master and
slave is a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous
passions, the most unremitting despotism on one
part, and degrading submission on the other. Our
children see this, and learn to imitate it; for man
is an imitative animal. This quality is the germ
of all education in him. From his cradle to his
grave, he is learning to do what he sees others do.
The man must be a prodigy, who can retain his
manners and morals undepressed by such circum-
stances. With the morals of the people, their in-
dustry, also, is destroyed."

In relation to its injustice and impolicy, he ob-
serves:

"That disposition to theft, with which they have
been branded, must be ascribed to their situation,
and not to any depravity of the moral sense. The
man in whose favor no laws of property exist,
probably feels himself less bound to respect those
made in favor of others. When arguing for our-
selves, we lay it down as a fundamental principle,
that laws, to be just, must give a reciprocation of
right; that without this, they are mere arbitrary
rules of conduct, founded in force, and not in con-
science; and it is a problem, which I give to the
master to solve, whether the religious precepts
against the violation of property were not framed
for him as well as his slaves; and whether the slave
may not as justifiably take a little from one who
has taken all from him, as he may slay one who
would slay him. That a change in the relations
in which a man is placed, should change his ideas
of moral right and wrong, is neither new nor pecu-
liar to the color of the blacks."

"The opinion that they are inferior, in the facul-
ties of reason and imagination, must be hazarded
with great diffidence. And with what execration
should the statesman be loaded who, permitting
one-half the citizens thus to trample on the rights
of the other, transforms those into despots and
these into enemies; destroys the morals of the one
part, and the amor patrie of the other?"

In reference to the future consequences of a
continuance of this system, the same writer re-
marks:

"Deep-rooted prejudices, entertained by the
whites; ten thousand recollections of the blacks,
of the injuries they have sustained; new provoca-
tions; the real distinctions which nature has made,
and many other circumstances, will divide us into
parties, and produce convulsions which will proba-
bly never end but in the extermination of the one
race or the other. And can the liberties of a na-
tion be thought secure when we have removed
their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of
the people that these liberties are the gift of God?
that they are not to be violated but with his wrath?
Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect
that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep for
ever; that, considering numbers, nature and natu-
ral means only, a revolution of the wheel of
fortune, an exchange of situation, is among possi-
ble events; that it may become probable by super-
natural interference. The Almighty has no attribu-
te which can take side with us in such a contest."

On the subject of emancipation, and the natural
tendency of governments to degenerate, he ex-
presses the following sentiments:

"In the very first session held under a Law for
the perpetual prohibition of the importation of
slaves. 'This will, in some measure, stop the in-
flux of this great political and moral evil, while
the minds of our citizens may be ripening for a
complete emancipation of human nature.'

"I think a change is already perceptible, since
the origin of the present revolution. The spirit
of the master is abating—that of the slave rising
from the dust; his condition mollifying—the way,
I hope, preparing, under the auspices of Heaven,
for a total emancipation; and this is disposed, in
the order of events, to be with the consent of the
masters, rather than by their extirpation."

"But the spirit of the times may alter, will alter.
Our rulers will become corrupt, our people care-
less. A single zealot may commence persecution,
and better men may be his victims. It can never
be too often repeated, that the time for fixing every
essential right on a legal basis, is while our rulers
are honest, and ourselves united. From the con-
clusion of this war, we shall be going down hill.
It will not then be necessary to resort every mo-
ment to the people for support. They will be for-
gotten, therefore, and their rights disregarded.
They will forget themselves, but in the sole faculty
of making money, and will never think of uniting
to effect a due respect for their rights. The shack-
les, therefore, which shall not be knocked off, at
the conclusion of the war, will remain on us long,
will be made heavier and heavier, till our rights
shall revive or expire in a convulsion."

Such were the sentiments of Mr. Jefferson, on
these questions, as openly avowed, and widely
disseminated, during the struggle for indepen-
dence.

At the commencement, and during the progress
of the Revolution, and for many years subsequent,
there was a general desire, expectation, and inten-
tion of abolishing this system. In the articles of
confederation of 1777, formed for mutual union
and defence, the right of citizenship and equal pri-
vileges was secured to all the free inhabitants, ir-
respective of color, in the several States, paupers,
vagrants, and fugitives from justice, only excepted.

On the adoption of the present Constitution of
the United States, the strongest objections arose
in the several States upon this important sub-
ject. In Virginia, the following opinions were
expressed, and expressed, by her most eminent
statesmen, in the convention held for the purpose
of deliberating upon its provisions.

Upon that clause of the Constitution, restricting
Congress from prohibiting the importation of slaves
until 1808, Mr. Mason remarked: "This is a fatal
section, which has created more danger than any
other. Under the Royal Government, this evil
was looked upon as a great oppression, and many
attempts were made to prevent it; but the interest
of the African merchant prevented its prohibition.
No sooner did the revolution take place than it was
thought of. It was one of the greatest causes of
our separation from Great Britain. Its exclusion
has been a principal object of this State, and most
of the States in this Union. The augmentation of
slaves weakens the States, and such a trade is dis-

bolical in itself, and disgraceful to mankind."
On the same subject, Mr. Tyler observed: "He
thought the reasons urged by gentlemen, in de-
fence of it, were inconclusive and ill-founded. It
was one cause of complaint against British tyranny
that this trade was permitted. The revolution had
put a period to it, but now it was to be revived.
He thought nothing could justify it. His earnest
desire was, that it should be handed down to pos-
terity, that he had opposed this wicked clause."

Mr. Johnson, on the same occasion, remarked as
follows: "Look at the 1st section of our bill of
rights. It says that all men are, by nature, equal-
ly free and independent. Does that paper (the
Constitution) acknowledge this? No, it denies it.
They tell us that they see a progressive danger of
bringing about emancipation. The principle has
been since the Revolution. Let us do what we
will, it will come round. Slavery has been the
foundation of that impiety and dissipation which
have been so much disseminated among our coun-
trymen. If it were totally abolished it would do
much good."

The opinions of Washington, upon the question
of emancipation, were equally explicit. In his
correspondence with Lafayette, and other eminent
statesmen, after the close of the Revolutionary
war, he says: "It is among my first wishes to see
some plan adopted, by which slavery in this coun-
try, may be abolished by law. It certainly might,
and assuredly ought to be effected, and that too,
by legislative authority. There are, in Pennsyl-
vania, laws for the gradual abolition of slavery,
which neither Maryland nor Virginia have at pre-
sent, but which nothing is more certain than that
they must have, and at a period not remote."

Mr. Iredell, afterwards a Judge of the Supreme
Court of the United States, in the Convention of
North Carolina, observed: "When the entire aboli-
tion of slavery takes place, it will be an event
which must be pleasing to every generous mind
and every friend of human nature."

William Pinckney, in the House of Delegates
of Maryland, in 1789, in advocating the emanci-
pation of slaves, declared that, "by the eternal
principles of natural justice, no master in the State,
has a right to hold his slave in bondage for a single
hour. I would as soon believe the incoherent tale
of a school-boy, who should tell me he had been
frightened by a ghost, as that the grant of this per-
mission ought, in any degree, to alarm us. Are
we apprehensive that these men will become more
dangerous by becoming freemen? Are we alarm-
ed, lest by being admitted into the enjoyment of
civil rights, they will be inspired with a deadly
enmity against the rights of others? How much
more rational would it be to argue, that the natural
enemy of the privileges of freemen is he who is
robbed of them himself."

Such were the doctrines promulgated to the
people and to the whole civilized world, on these
ever interesting and exciting subjects, by those
who were hailed, as the champions of liberty, and
the rights of man, in the early history of our re-
public; and although their practical influence may
have been lost upon their descendants, still their
benign effects upon the destinies of this nation
will endure and be felt to the latest posterity.

Had the same combined efforts been made to
prevent the dissemination of these principles—to
suppress all discussion of them—to proscribe their
advocates—to stifle the press, and to excite public
alarm and prejudice, as at the present day; instead
of now seeing one-half of our country freed from
its demoralizing and withering influences, we
might have beheld that system spread over the
whole length and breadth of our land. Had the
same spirit of intolerance, of self-interest, of sec-
tional feeling, and of moral apathy and timidity
pervaded the breasts of the patriots of the revolu-
tion, and of those who swayed the councils of the
nation, at that period when our territory a popu-
lation of freemen, instead of beholding, with em-
otions of gratitude and patriotic pride, the rising
eminence of our own State, its rapid progress in
wealth, population, and enterprise; with its pre-
sent moral, industrious, and intelligent yeomanry,
we might have witnessed it, intercepted in its
infancy, borne down with a servile population,
shorn of its vigor and energy, and suffering under
all the calamities and apprehensions, arising from
a system which converts the productive, laboring
class of the community, which should be its
strength and defence, into the natural enemies of
the State.

The Responsibilities of Ohio in Relation to Slavery.

But it is said that Ohio, having never partici-
pated in this system, is exempted from its respon-
sibilities, and absolved from all moral obligation,
to extend shelter or protection to that portion of
the human family, which has been made the pecu-
liar victims of this policy; and that we may drive
them from our borders by acts of outlawry, or
subject them, in this land of their birth, to a state
of perpetual degradation and suffering, by de-
priving them of the power of "acquiring, possess-
ing, and protecting property," by arbitrary laws,
notwithstanding the following declaration is found in
the constitution of our State:

"That the general great and essential prin-
ciples of liberty and free government, may be re-
cognized and forever unalterably established, we
declare: That all men are born equally free and
independent, and have certain natural, inherent,
and inalienable rights; amongst which are the
enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquir-
ing, possessing, and protecting property, and ob-
taining happiness and safety."

Let us examine, for a moment, this claim of ex-
emption from all participation in this system, and
consequent discharge from all moral obligation, to
this unfortunate and long abused race.

Their first introduction to this country was con-
trary to their wishes, and an act of force and op-
pression on the part of the government and people
of these States. By our own people they were
torn from their friends, their homes, and their
country, transported to our shores, sold in our
markets, and purchased by our ancestors; and not-
withstanding this traffic was denounced by the phi-
lanthropists and statesmen of that day, in many
of the colonies, and made the subject of complaint
and remonstrance to the Royal Government; still,
it was sustained by the people and their provincial
Assemblies. For we are informed by Mr. Jeff-
erson, that in Virginia, under the Royal Govern-
ment, they had obtained a law, imposing such a duty
upon their importation, as amounted nearly to a
prohibition, when it was repealed by their As-
sembly.

In reviewing our history, down to the period of
the revolution, we shall find but little to exonerate
our ancestors from the responsibilities which are
involved in the establishment and progress of this

inhuman system. Although it was authorized and
encouraged by the Crown of Great Britain, to
which we were then subject, yet it could not have
been sustained, unless sanctioned by the people.

During our own struggles for liberty and inde-
pendence, the progress of this system was sus-
pended. Its impolicy and injustice were very
where admitted, and its origin and continuance
were charged upon the British government, as an
act of tyranny and oppression. Personal liberty
was proclaimed throughout the nation, as the birth-
right of man, of which no human government
could rightfully deprive him but for the punish-
ment of crimes. In many of the States, includ-
ing Virginia, laws were passed emancipating the
slaves, on condition they would join the revolu-
tionary army, and fight for their own and their
country's freedom.

By the moral force of these principles, the
cause of liberty was sustained through the arduous
conflict, and our independence established. By
that event, we were freed from all foreign influence
and control over our action upon this subject.
On taking our rank among the nations of the earth,
we assumed all the responsibilities of an independ-
ent sovereignty. It is true, that under the articles
of union and confederacy, the powers of the national
government were limited and defined. Yet it was
during their existence, that the most effectual
checks had been interposed, to the extension of
this system, by the national authority. The rights
of citizenship were secured to all men in the sev-
eral States, except slaves, paupers, vagabonds,
and criminals.

The further extension of slavery was prohibited
by an act of Congress, declaring it should forever
be excluded from the Territory Northwest of the
Ohio, which had been ceded to the United States,
and out of which new States were to be formed
and admitted into the Union. The justice and
propriety of this prohibition were so universally
admitted at that period, that it met with no op-
position, and was carried into an ordinance, and de-
clared unalterable, except by common consent,
with but one dissenting vote. So far as power
had been conferred upon the National Government,
it had been exercised, to interdict and restrain its
further progress. In most of the State Govern-
ments, the same public feeling had been manifest-
ed. At the same period, the country was suffer-
ing under all the calamities growing out of a pro-
tracted and desolating war, from financial embar-
rassment, from disaffection in a portion of the
people, and from the want of an efficient power in
the General Government to remedy and correct
these disorders.

Under all these embarrassing circumstances, the
people were invoked to appoint delegates to a Na-
tional Convention, to revise the articles of con-
federation, and form a more efficient National Gov-
ernment.

Such a Convention was held, and the present
Constitution of the United States was the produc-
tion of their deliberations. By that instrument,
the assent of the people, and the sanction of the
National Government, were obtained, for the re-
vival and continuance of this system for the period
of twenty years.

The importation of slaves into the republic,
was thus authorized by the people of the United
States, in their national character, and made an
item of general revenue, in which they were all to
participate. By the same national authority, and
without any constitutional obligation, but in direct
contravention of its avowed policy, and determined
purpose, solemnly, deliberately, and almost unani-
mously, expressed in the celebrated ordinance, this
system has been extended over the Territories un-
der its jurisdiction, from which new States have
been formed and admitted into the Union, until it
is claimed as a right, over which the General Gov-
ernment has no discretion or control. In this
manner, seven new States, in which this system
has been established, have been added to the
Union, since the ordinance of 1787, and since the
adoption of the Constitution; and the territory out
of which most of them have been formed, has
been acquired by purchase, since the State of Ohio
has had a voice in the councils of the Nation. On
behalf of the people of the State, we have also ac-
knowledge our mutual obligations, in common
with others, resulting from this system, by the
passage of the following resolutions, which were
transmitted to Congress, and to all the States in
the Union:

"Resolved by the General Assembly of the
State of Ohio, That the consideration of a sys-
tem, providing for the gradual emancipation of the
people of color held in servitude, in the United
States, be recommended to the Legislatures of the
several States of the American Union, and to the
Congress of the United States.

"Resolved, That it is expedient that such a sys-
tem should be predicated upon the principle, that
the evil of slavery is a national one, and that the
people, and the States of this Union, ought mutu-
ally to participate in the duties and burthens of
removing it."

After having thus, in our national character, con-
tributed to the extension and encouragement of this
system; after having participated in the system of
deriving a revenue from the importation of this
class of our population; after seeing them eman-
cipate by other States, and restored to their natu-
ral rights, for risking their lives in securing our
liberties, and for subsequently defending them, and
for other praise-worthy actions; we then seek to
avoid the responsibilities and inconveniences arising
from these measures, by assuming another char-
acter, and exercising the prerogatives of a sepa-
rate sovereignty. With this view, we have enact-
ed, from time to time, the most odious and oppres-
sive laws, to degrade and depress this portion of
our population.

Regardless of the principles of justice, of natu-
ral rights, of moral duty, and of the provisions
of the Federal and State Constitutions, the follow-
ing provisions have been incorporated into our
laws, and remain on our statute books at the pre-
sent time:

Laws of Ohio Concerning Colored People.

1st. That no black or mulatto person shall be
permitted to settle or reside in this State, unless he
shall procure a certificate of his freedom, under the
seal of a court of record. And no such per-
son shall emigrate and settle within the State, until
he shall enter into bonds, with two freehold secu-
rities, in the sum of five hundred dollars, condi-
tioned, in the sum of his good behavior, and the payment
of all charges which may be incurred on his account;
for which bond and certificate, he is to pay one
dollar; and it is made the duty of the officers of
the township, to remove out of the State, any such
emigrant, not complying with these laws; and no
person, a resident of the State, is permitted to em-
ploy, in any manner, any black or mulatto, not hav-
ing such certificate, under severe penalties.

2d. That no black or mulatto person shall be
sworn, or give evidence, in any court, or elsewhere,
in this State, in any cause where a white person is
a party, or in any prosecution, on behalf of the
State against a white person.

3d. They are deprived of all participation in the
school fund, arising from donations made by Con-
gress for the support of schools.

4th. The right of trial by jury is withheld from
them, in cases involving their personal liberties.

Your committee propose to examine these sev-
eral items in the order thus presented:

How far the Constitution was Designed to Re-strict the Rights of Colored People.

It has already been observed, that by the articles
of confederation, the right of citizenship, of in-
gress and egress, to and from all the States, and
the privileges of trade and commerce, were secured
to all free persons within its jurisdiction, irrespec-
tive of color. From the formation of the con-
federation until the adoption of the present Consti-
tution of the United States, there were no consti-
tutional restrictions imposed upon this race, unless
they were slaves. They were entitled to the same
rights and privileges of any other class, and recog-
nized as citizens, in the several States of the Con-
federacy. Under the Territorial Government, they
exercised the right of suffrage, in common with all
other citizens, down to the time of the adoption
of our Constitution, and formation of a State Gov-
ernment. They voted for delegates to attend the
Convention, to form our present Constitution, in
1802.

And here the inquiry should be made, in what
mode, by what instrument, and to what extent have
these rights and privileges been restricted or taken
away? Do we find any restrictions upon them in
the Constitution of the U. States? There are none
to be found in that document. All free persons
are numbered for representation, excluding Indians
not taxed, to which were to be added three-fifths of
the slaves. It is true that the qualifications of citi-
zens and electors are not defined, as in the articles
of confederation, but the constitution does not pre-
clude them from enjoying the same rights and
privileges they held under the confederation; nor
does it make any distinction on account of color.
The qualifications of electors and citizenship are
left to the States. It declares, however, that "the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several
States."

Under this state of things, the convention as-
sembled which formed the present constitution of
this state. In the journal of their proceedings will
be found the subjects which were brought into dis-
cussion, and the manner in which they were dis-
posed of. The question of depriving the colored
population of the right of suffrage, which they had
hitherto enjoyed, was one on which the members
were much divided. On a motion to insert a
clause to continue this privilege to all males re-
siding in the territory, it was carried in the affir-
mative, by a vote of 19 to 15, every member being
present. A motion to extend the same privilege
to their descendants was lost by a vote of 17 to 16,
one member being absent. On the third reading
of the article, a motion was made to strike out the
clause which had been previously inserted, extend-
ing this privilege to persons of color as above
stated, which was carried by the casting vote of
the president, on a tie of all the members. On
the question of striking out a clause which had
been inserted, excluding them from giving testi-
mony in courts of justice against white persons, it
was carried in the affirmative by a vote of 17 to 16,
one member absent.

It will thus be seen how far their rights and
privileges were intended to be restricted by the
framers of the constitution, and the majorities by
which the various propositions to circumscribe
them were carried or rejected. The right of suf-
frage was taken from them by the casting vote of
the presiding officer; but a majority of the con-
vention decided that they would not exclude them
from giving evidence in courts of justice. So far
as their rights and privileges were restricted by
the constitution, and these restrictions incorporated
into the constitution which has been accepted by
the people, and made the paramount law of the
legislature. It is for the repeal of those laws
which have been made in direct violation of the
plainest provisions, the most essential principles,
and solemn declarations contained in that sacred
instrument, which were to be "for ever unaltera-
bly established," that these numerous petitions
have been preferred. It is for the restoration of
those natural and inalienable rights, which the
constitution declares belong to "all men, of enjoy-
ing life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and obtaining happiness and
safety," that appeals have been so constantly made
to the legislature by citizens from every section of
the state.

The Law demanding Certificates of Freedom Unconstitutional and Pernicious.

That requisition of the law compelling them
to obtain certificates of freedom, under the seal
of a court, as a condition of residence in the
state, in numerous instances, could never be com-
plied with by those on whom it was intended to
operate. They have no power or authority by
which they could procure such certificate. It is not
made the duty of any court to listen to any personal
application for that purpose, or to issue such certi-
ficate, in any case whatever. It imposes upon them a
duty which they have no power to perform. It
reverses all the ordinary rules of justice and the
maxims of law, by raising a presumption that
every one is a slave until he shall prove himself to
be free, in a state where slavery does not exist.
It is derogatory of the authority of our own con-
stitution, which recognizes every person within
its jurisdiction as a freeman, and renders it subor-
dinate to the laws of other states. It withholds
the protection of our constitution and laws from
freemen in our own state, and makes them sub-
servient to the system of slavery.

It is a species of solemn mockery in legisla-
tion, unworthy the character and dignity of a free
government, to impose upon any portion of the
community such conditions of enjoying the rights
and privileges secured by the letter and spirit of
the constitution to all, as must necessarily exclude
them from all participation in them.

That such was the design of these laws, and
that such would be their practical effect, if carried
into execution, few will deny.

It was never believed that the law, requiring
bonds, with two freehold securities, in the penal
sum of \$500, as a condition of residence, would
ever be complied with, nor was it intended by the
makers that it ever should be. Its evident design
was to drive this portion of our population into
other states. It was an unrighteous attempt to

accomplish indirectly and covertly, what they
would shrink from doing openly and frankly.
—Under the plausible pretext of disobedience to
these requirements, they were to be cast out from
amongst us, placed beyond the protection of law,
and deprived of the means of procuring suste-
nance and support.

To effect this object, the citizens of the states
were restricted in the exercise of privileges which
are allowed to those out of the state.

All residents of the state were prohibited, by
penal laws, from hiring or employing, in any man-
ner whatever, any person subject to this law, who
had failed to comply with its provisions, while the
citizens of other states, who had not gained a resi-
dence, were exempted from such penalties.

Nor were the projectors of this measure sat-
isfied with casting them out beyond the protection
of law, and depriving them of the means of obtain-
ing a lawful subsistence; but they made it the duty
of the officers of townships to remove them by
force out of the state, for disobedience to these
laws. By the same process of legislation every
right secured by the constitution may be taken
from the citizens of the state. The right of suf-
frage, the right to bear arms, the right of the
people to assemble together and consult for the
common good; the right to speak, write, and print
upon any subject, might be trammelled with such
conditions, as to preclude their free exercise by a
large portion of the citizens to whom they are se-
cured. There is no greater security given for the
right of suffrage, to those who now enjoy it, by
the constitution, than is given to all men of ac-
quiring and protecting property, pursuing hap-
piness and safety, and of enjoying personal liberty.
The constitution was formed with a full knowledge
that our population was comprised of white and
colored persons.

The rights and privileges of the one class were
as clearly defined and settled, and as sacredly se-
cured, as the other, by that instrument. The dis-
crimination was distinctly made and expressed in
unequivocal terms, whenever it was intended to
confer any political privilege upon the one, from
which the other was to be excluded.

That clause in the constitution which declares, that
"in all elections, all white male inhabitants above
the age of 21 years, having resided in the state one
year next preceding the election, and who have
paid, or are charged with a state or county tax,
shall enjoy the right of an elector," has no greater
force than those which secure to all others, not
electors, the natural and inalienable rights which
were extended to them, in terms equally clear
and explicit. To restrain the exercise of either
by imposing conditions unjust and oppressive,
would be equally repugnant to the constitu-
tion. No person was to be transported

delinquency of legislators, and of the moral virtue, intelligence, and discernment of the people. As a measure of public policy, it has been wholly inoperative, because it was not sanctioned by the community. It has not driven them from the state, or placed any check upon their immigration. They have found their way into this state as readily, and as numerous, as into others; where no such conditions have been imposed. It is contrary to sound policy to enact laws so repugnant to the moral sense of the community, as to preclude their execution. It is degrading to the dignity of the state—it is trifling with the moral feelings of its citizens, to continue laws in existence, under which severe penalties are hourly incurred by the great mass of the community, under a belief and expectation that they will not be enforced.

The Law relating to the Testimony of Colored People Unconstitutional, Unjust, and Injurious.

In relation to the law excluding persons of color from giving testimony in courts of justice where a white person is a party, or in state prosecutions against a white person, your committee would observe, that the great end of all judicial tribunals should be to dispense justice to all, irrespective of rank or condition, and to arrive at the truth in all their investigations: That testimony is as necessary for defence as for accusation; as essential to ascertain innocence, as to establish guilt: That every member of the community is equally interested in the due administration of justice—in the protection of innocence—in the punishment of crime, and in securing all necessary and proper means of attaining these important objects. Any arbitrary laws which would take from the courts the power of hearing testimony in their researches after truth, or which would deprive any individual of the means of obtaining a disclosure of facts, and circumstances essential to his defence, when charged with a criminal offence, would be a denial of justice, fraught with more dangerous consequences to society, than if such facts were to be disclosed by witnesses who were not entitled to implicit confidence. Nor can any substantial reasons be discovered why such facts should be withheld on the trial of any cause, because they rested in the knowledge of colored persons alone. Is it because they are not entitled to credit, or for the want of capacity and intelligence; or because they are too deficient in moral sensibility to understand and appreciate the obligations of an oath, that their testimony should be excluded? It will hardly be contended that any of these reasons will apply to the entire race; and if they would, then the law, to be consistent, should exclude their testimony in all cases. If their statements under oath will elicit facts, or elucidate the truth in one case, where equal and exact justice should be administered, by what equitable rule can they be excluded in others?

The constitution secures to every person the right of an impartial trial, of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and of the due administration of justice, without denial or delay. By an act of legislation we have impaired these constitutional rights, by depriving our citizens of the benefit of witnesses in their favor, in prosecutions for criminal offences involving life and liberty. We have established, by law, an arbitrary rule, which necessarily involves partiality in criminal trials, which in many cases might lead to a denial of justice.

In trials for capital offences, where the punishment is death, and in all others of minor importance, the same means of defence, and proof of innocence, are denied to the citizens, which are extended to those who are disfranchised. A white citizen is prohibited from procuring a disclosure of facts within the knowledge of persons of color, which might be decisive of his fate, where life or death was suspended on the issue. And still, the same facts might be disclosed, in the same court of justice, on the very next trial, provided the ministers of the law should, on personal inspection of the traverser at the bar, be satisfied that he had more of the African than of the European blood in his veins.

The same degrading duty is again imposed upon the ministers of justice, of making the discrimination from the tincture of the skin in the reception of witnesses. How often do we witness in our halls of justice the humiliating spectacle of a score of witnesses, of various shades of color, before our judges, to ascertain whether they are white enough to testify, or whether their color is too dark to permit them to be sworn in that particular cause. For it should ever be remembered, that these questions are finally to be decided by the court, not upon any proof of parentage, or admixture of the two races, but simply upon profert being made of the person, they declare, whether his complexion approximates the nearest to the standard color of white or black.

And upon these decisions, thus arbitrarily made, are suspended the rights of our citizens, to prove themselves guiltless of the most heinous offences, and the power of the state to obtain evidence necessary to procure the conviction of the most flagrant transgressors of the laws.

Instead of securing an impartial trial, and equal exact justice to all, the most arbitrary and unjust distinctions are made in the fundamental rules, by which the rights of property, of liberty, and of life, are determined.

And the application of these rules is not made to depend upon the important questions involved in the issue, but upon the character and color of the parties—a distinction which is utterly subversive of every well-settled and established principle of justice and equity in civilized society.

The right of a party in court to the benefit of certain testimony being dependent upon these nice distinctions, it becomes highly important that our judges should possess the requisite qualifications to analyse and determine the precise shade of color, which is to form the dividing line between those who are to be denominated white, and those who shall be considered black.

The point upon which all these rights are to turn, should be known and defined, and when the standard is fixed, it should be incorporated into the law, for the benefit of all suitors in court, that they might have an opportunity of bringing themselves and their witnesses to the test, previous to the trial of their cause. And so long as those laws are in force, the property is suggested, of changing the ancient emblems of justice, in conformity to these provisions, and instead of being represented as blind, it should assume the form of an argus, and in lieu of the suspended even balance, it should display a graduated scale of colors, by which its favors were to be dispensed, according to the condition and complexion of the humble supplicants in its temple.

Such are the absurdities into which we are led whenever we undertake to change immutable principles, and make them bend to our prejudices, or conform to particular circumstances. The organization of our judicial tribunals, the manner in which our juries are constituted, the ordinary rules of evidence, and the power of our courts to scan the testimony of witnesses and set aside a verdict, are sufficient safeguards for the administration of justice, without the intervention of these arbitrary laws.

There tribunals are all necessarily composed of white citizens, and to their discriminating intelligence, we may safely confide the power of determining the credibility of witnesses, and the proper weight which should be given to the testimony, of either white or colored persons.

In many cases of frequent occurrence, the testimony of colored persons is required, to bring

criminals to justice, and maintain the sovereignty of the laws, where they are neither parties to the suit, on in any manner connected with the transaction by which the laws have been violated. It is the only mode by which they can be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty, or property. Their persons and property are constantly exposed to the lawless violence of the most profligate members of society, without the hope of redress, unless the transactions have been witnessed by others, not of their color. They are deprived of the protection of law, and denied the means of obtaining justice in our courts, or a redress for injuries done in their lands, goods, and persons, contrary to the provisions of the constitution, declaring they should be secured to every person.

The question of excluding them from testifying in courts of justice against white persons, was also definitely settled, by a recorded vote, in the convention which formed the constitution of the State. It was there decided, on due deliberation by the members of the convention, that they should not be excluded from the exercise of this privilege; and they continued to enjoy it until the passage of the law in question. By what authority can the rights and privileges which were passed upon and settled by the constitution, be revoked by legislation?

That instrument, after defining and establishing the powers of the various departments of the Government, after fixing the qualifications of electors, and public officers; after enumerating the natural and political rights and privileges which should be extended to all persons; after declaring that certain great and essential principles recognising these rights should be "forever unalterably established"—in the closing paragraph of the last article reads as follows: "To guard against the transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare that all powers not hereby delegated, remain with the people."

The right and privilege of testifying in courts of justice having been exercised by this class of our population previous to the adoption of the constitution of our State; the question having been raised in the convention which formed it, and after mature deliberation settled by a vote in favor of the continuance of this right; and no power having been delegated by the constitution to the Legislature, to abridge the rights of the people, as recognised and settled by that instrument, it would seem that a revocation of it would transcend the powers delegated to the Legislature.

The abrogation of this right does not affect the interests of the colored population alone. It involves the rights and privileges of every member of society. So far as the body politic is concerned in the protection of innocence and the punishment of guilt, its power is abridged by the suppression of testimony which might establish either the one or the other. The rights of every individual citizen are affected, because they are deprived of the constitutional privilege of obtaining the testimony of witnesses in their favor, where their property, and life are at stake.

The rights of the colored population are left wholly unprotected, and their property, persons, and lives, exposed to the lawless depredations of every abandoned member of the community, without the means of obtaining redress.

Believing such restrictions to be contrary to sound policy, injurious to public morals, an obstruction to the impartial administration of justice, an infringement of constitutional rights, and repugnant to the spirit and genius of our political institutions, your committee recommend a repeal of that section of the law excluding them from giving testimony.

The Exclusion of Persons of Color from the Benefits of the School-Funds, &c.—Unconstitutional, Unjust and Impolitic.

On the subject of excluding the children of persons of color from participating in the benefits of the school funds, arising from donations made by the United States and from taxation, the following observations are submitted for the consideration of the Senate.

Before the organization of a State Government, the following proposition, with others was incorporated into a law of Congress, for the acceptance or rejection of the then Territory (now State) of Ohio, on condition that the State would, by an irrevocable ordinance, exempt the lands of the United States from taxation for the term of five years from and after the day of sale: "That the section number sixteen in every township—and, where such section has been sold, granted, or disposed of, other lands equivalent thereto, and most contiguous to the same—shall be granted to the inhabitants of such township for the use of schools."

The State of Ohio, in convention assembled, accepted the above proposition, on condition "that all the lands before mentioned to be appropriated by the United States for the support of schools, shall be vested in the Legislature of this State in trust for said purpose."

This modification of the former proposition was agreed to by Congress, and the grants were made in accordance with it, and the title "vested in the Legislature of Ohio in trust for the use aforesaid, and for no other use, intent, or purpose whatever," for and no other use, intent, or purpose whatever, was made a condition of that grant of section sixteen in each township, or its equivalent, was to be made to the inhabitants of such township for the use of schools therein.

That it was not to depend upon any action of the township, or upon the comparative number, character, or condition of the inhabitants; for at that period the country was a wilderness, and most of the townships were uninhabited. Still, that section or its equivalent was to be held in trust by the Legislature, for the inhabitants of the township, for the use of schools whenever it became inhabited. It was a donation secured to each township, for the benefit of its future inhabitants, without reservation or distinction, except that it was to be appropiated to the use of schools.

The State had no control over the sale of the lands comprising the township, nor could it make a selection of purchasers, who were to constitute their future inhabitants. The lands might be taken up and settled by foreigners, or by persons not naturalized, who would nevertheless be entitled to the benefit of the donation, and could rightfully claim the execution of the trust. The beneficial interest arising from the grant accrued to the inhabitants, whoever they might be.

The power of the Legislature was limited by the terms of the grant, and could only carry into execution its express stipulations.

If an entire township had been sold by the United States to persons of color alone, or to foreign immigrants not naturalized, and they should constitute its only inhabitants, would they not have been rightfully and legally entitled to all the benefits of the grant? If they would not, to whom would their interest have reverted? If, under such circumstances, it should have been withheld from the inhabitants, and declared forfeited to the State, or applied to other townships, would it revert back to the proper township, on the removal of some half dozen white citizens within its limits?

If the same grant had been made by an individual proprietor of a township of land, and he had subsequently sold every other section within it to colored persons, could they not have lawfully claimed the benefit of the trust estate; and would not their claims have been allowed and enforced by our courts, under the ordinary rules and principles of law?

These various questions must have forced themselves upon the consideration of the members of the convention which formed the constitution of the State, and the conditions of the proposed grant were before them, for free acceptance or rejection. Before yielding their assent, they had the right of proposing any modification of its terms.

The only one upon which their acceptance was predicated, having any bearing upon the question now at issue, was, that the property conferred by the grant should be vested in the Legislature of the State, in trust for the purposes certified in the ordinance. When the ordinance was lawfully claimed, in any one of the original States, such privilege may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor service, as aforesaid. "The inhabitants of said territory, shall always be entitled to the benefit of laws, customs, and usages of the original States, in all respects, save and except those in relation to slavery, which shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Congress of the United States."

This was the first constitutional law, which guaranteed these rights to the inhabitants of the State, and defined and settled the relative duties to the original States. To whom were these benefits of trial by jury and the writ of habeas corpus secured? To all the future inhabitants of the Territory, or States which should be formed out of it. No distinction was made, no preference was given, to any portion of the future people, or to any class of persons, whether citizens, or aliens, who should thereafter reside within its limits, or be subject to its jurisdiction.

What was the tenure by which these rights were to be held? They were to remain forever unalterable, unless by common consent. To have vested each portion of the rights conferred by the ordinance upon them in relation to fugitives from labor or service? Not in the least. They were bound to take cognizance of such claims, and make provision for their investigation and decision, as in all other cases. Whether they were fugitives from labor or service from another State, or whether such services were lawfully claimed, were preliminary questions for judicial decision. The law embraced all cases where service was claimed to be due from one person to another, out of this State, whether by indenture, apprenticeship, or otherwise.

The claim could be set up against one person as well as against another, and the same law applied to all cases, and the mode of proceeding would be the same in all cases under the same law. It would have been preposterous to suppose that the manner of determining these questions, was to be dictated by any other authority than the sovereign power of the State. To have vested each portion of the rights conferred by the ordinance upon them in relation to fugitives from labor or service? Not in the least. They were bound to take cognizance of such claims, and make provision for their investigation and decision, as in all other cases. Whether they were fugitives from labor or service from another State, or whether such services were lawfully claimed, were preliminary questions for judicial decision. The law embraced all cases where service was claimed to be due from one person to another, out of this State, whether by indenture, apprenticeship, or otherwise.

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Among which were the following: "There shall be neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude in said Territory, otherwise than in punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted: Provided always, That any person escaping from any State or Territory, who has been lawfully claimed, in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor service, as aforesaid." "The inhabitants of said territory, shall always be entitled to the benefit of laws, customs, and usages of the original States, in all respects, save and except those in relation to slavery, which shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Congress of the United States."

This was the first constitutional law, which guaranteed these rights to the inhabitants of the State, and defined and settled the relative duties to the original States. To whom were these benefits of trial by jury and the writ of habeas corpus secured? To all the future inhabitants of the Territory, or States which should be formed out of it. No distinction was made, no preference was given, to any portion of the future people, or to any class of persons, whether citizens, or aliens, who should thereafter reside within its limits, or be subject to its jurisdiction.

What was the tenure by which these rights were to be held? They were to remain forever unalterable, unless by common consent. To have vested each portion of the rights conferred by the ordinance upon them in relation to fugitives from labor or service? Not in the least. They were bound to take cognizance of such claims, and make provision for their investigation and decision, as in all other cases. Whether they were fugitives from labor or service from another State, or whether such services were lawfully claimed, were preliminary questions for judicial decision. The law embraced all cases where service was claimed to be due from one person to another, out of this State, whether by indenture, apprenticeship, or otherwise.

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